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ABSTRACT

Power transmission grid infrastructures deliver electricity across large distance and are vital
to the functioning of modern society. Increasingly these setups embody highly-coupled cyberphysical systems where advanced telecommunications networks are used to send status and
control information to operate power transmission grid components, i.e., “smart grids”. However,
due to the high interdependency between the communication and power grid network layers,
failure events can lead to further loss of control of key grid components, i.e., even if they are
undamaged. In turn, such dependencies can exacerbate cascading failures and lead to larger
electricity blackouts, particularly under disaster conditions. As a result, a range of studies have
looked at modelling failures in interdependent smart grids. However most of these designs have
not considered the use of proactive network-level survivability schemes. Indeed, these strategies
can help maintain vital control connectivity during failures and potentially lead to reduced
outages. Hence this thesis addresses this critical area and applies connection protection
methodologies to reduce communication/control disruption in transmission grids. The
performance of these schemes is then analyzed using detailed simulation for a sample IEEE
transmission grid. Overall findings show a good reduction in the number of overloaded
transmission lines when applying network-level recovery schemes.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Power transmission grids play a vital role in delivering electricity from large generation
sites to sub-stations serving end-user distribution networks. Now in recent years many utility
providers have invested significant resources to revamp these infrastructures and improve their
efficiency and reliability. Most notably, advanced telecommunication networking technologies
are being extensively used to interconnect transmission grid components with large network
operating center (NOC) sites, also termed as system control centers (SCC) [RAH13]. These
networks are then used to build higher-level supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems that allow regional balancing authorities (BA) to send/receive regular field updates of
critical grid measurements/parameters, i.e., to make crucial control decisions such as loadshedding [RAH13]. Note that these evolved setups are also termed as “smart” transmission grids
and in a broader sense, represent coupled cyber-physical systems (CPS) [KIM12].

1.1

Background

A high-level view of a smart power grid is shown in Figure 1.1. This setup consists of the
main utility power infrastructure, an overlying communication network, and well as a network of
human operators. The main role of the communication network is to transfer information
between remote monitoring and control agent systems [RAH13] and the main NOC site.
Specifically, various types of networked phasor measurement units (PMU) and phasor data
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concentrators (PDC) systems have been deployed in the field to collect information on the health
of system components, loads, etc. SCADA systems and human operators at the main NOC site
then use this distributed information to optimize power flow, and if necessary, initiate load
shedding behaviors by transmitting control commands to control agents.
Network Operation Centers

High-level control
SCADA, human control

Wired

Wireless
3/4G, WiMAX, LTE

Communication networks

IP, optical

Generation
(power plants)

Power
Transmission grid

Power
substation

Distribution

Transmission

Distribution

Figure 1.1: Overview of integrated “smart” transmission grid: power and networking mix

Now since transmission grids can span across wide geographic domains, a variety of
communication technologies are being used today, i.e., including wired and wireless, see
[YAN13] for a complete survey. However, for the most part, wireless technologies are being
increasingly deployed on the distribution side, where communication distances are relatively
small (under 10 km). Key examples here include wireless cellular, WiMAX (IEEE 802.16), and
2

even long term evolution (LTE), etc. Meanwhile, wired fiber-optic communications systems are
much more common on the longer-haul transmission side. These systems are relatively costeffective to deploy as most power utilities own the rights-of-way along their power line routes,
i.e., and can either deploy air or ground fiber. Note that the latter case is also termed as “optical
ground wire” [RAH13]. Overall, fiber transmission offers many saliencies here, including highbandwidth capacity and immunity to electromagnetic emissions and corrosion. Furthermore,
current state-of-the-art fiber-optic wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) networking
technologies also provide a very flexible and cost-effective means of partitioning and
provisioning abundant fiber bandwidth between network locations/sites. As a result, many
utilities have deployed these and related technologies.

1.2

Motivations

Now clearly, the reliable functioning of transmission grids under a range of fault
conditions is a major concern. For example, isolated power grid failures (lines, relays, switches,
or generator sites) will affect many local users whose distribution networks are directly served by
the faulty elements. Conversely, larger catastrophic events can be much more destructive,
yielding multiple system failures with very high levels of spatial and temporal correlation, i.e.,
after natural disasters (such as hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, and solar storms) or malicious
man-made attacks, such as those with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As recent examples,
hurricane Sandy (2012) and the Ontario ice storm (2013) resulted in widespread regional power
outages that affecting millions of residents for extended durations (days).
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In light of the above, there is critical need to address the reliability of smart grids under a
range of failure conditions. Of particular concern is the mitigation of cascading failures, which
can occur as utilities perform load-shedding actions to re-balance load across the remaining
working grid components. Indeed, increased interdependency between the power grid and
communication network can also worsen such cascading effects. Namely, power outages can
end up causing more communication nodes to lose power and fail. In turn, these failures can
disrupt control/communication to more transmission grid components (loads), resulting in more
uncontrolled loads. For example, Figure 1.2 depicts the rapid onset of cascading failures during
the large 2003 blackout event that affected the Northeastern United States and Canada [TFR04],
i.e., multi-fold increase in failed lines (lost generation units) within minutes of the initial failure.

Figure 1.2: Cascading failure effects in 2004 US-Canada blackout event, from [TFR04]
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In light of the above, many researchers are starting to study the impact of cascading
failures in interdependent power-communication grids. By and large, most of these studies have
taken a graph-theoretic approach towards analyzing the interdependencies (interplay) between
the

power

transmission

grid

[BLD10],[CAR02],[CAS13],[KHA14],

and

data

network

topologies,

see

[NEU13],[PAR13],[RAH12],[RAH13],[ROS08].

Overall, these efforts provide a detailed modelling of cascading behaviors, which in turn can
provide further design insights in to building improved data network topologies/overlays.

However, despite these contributions, there is still a pressing need to study the effect of
communication network survivability schemes on failures in smart power-communication grids.
For example, these strategies can help reduce communication/control disconnection in critical
grid components, thereby limiting the number of un-controllable loads. In turn, these
improvements have the potential to mitigate cascading failures and limit the size of blackout
events. However there are no known studies along these lines. Perhaps the only related work is
presented in [RAH12] and [RAH13], where the authors model the dependency of
communication networks on the underlying transmission grid using random probabilities.
Although this approach tries to incorporate communication network failures, fixed probabilities
do not capture the response of complex network survivability schemes under varying (multifailure) conditions. This forms the key motivation for this research.
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1.3

Problem Statement

This thesis focuses on the use of advanced telecommunication network protection schemes
in integrated communication/power smart transmission grids and analyses their detailed impacts
on various power grid system failures.

1.4

Scope and Objectives

The objective of this effort is study the effect of network-level recovery schemes in smart
transmission grids under varying failure conditions. The work focuses on realistic settings in
which control network topologies use fiber-optic wireline communication and mirror their
transmission grid counterparts. First, various protection algorithms are applied to help determine
the transmission grid components (substations, lines) that will lose communication/control with
the NOC site after a fault. Next, detailed power grid analyses are conducted to determine the
resulting line failures (blackout sizes) from these component disconnections. All communication
network simulations are done using the OPNET ModelerTM toolkit, whereas the ensuing power
analyses are done using the MATLAB MATPOWER package.

1.5

Research Approach

This overall research focuses on several key tasks. First, a detailed survey is done to
review the existing work on analysis of integrated/coupled communication/power networks. The
next step focuses on the selection and application of some well-known protection algorithms for
6

pre-provisioned network failure recovery. The goal here is to maintain vital connectivity between
utility operation control centers and remote transmission grid components under stressor
conditions. Several network recovery algorithms are then tested using the OPNET ModelerTM
toolkit to determine post-fault connectivity for varying failure scenarios in a sample power grid
topology. Finally, the above outputs are used to solve the resulting power flow models and
identify the set of transmission line failures yielding uncontrollable (disconnected) loads.

1.6

Thesis Outline

The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 first reviews the existing work in failure
modelling of integrated smart transmission grids. Next, Chapter 3 details some network
protection algorithms, including those for disaster recovery support, as well as a stochastic
modelling approach for computing power grid blackout sizes. Finally, Chapter 4 presents some
detailed analyses to quantify transmission grid failures (line outages) in a sample power grid
experiencing a range of fault conditions. Conclusions and future work directions are then
presented Chapter 5.

7

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND SURVEY

Survivability of integrated smart grids is a critical area of concern. Lately, a range of
studies have emerged on this topic, with most focusing on modelling the nature of failure
cascades between the two (power, data network) layers. Along these lines, this chapter reviews
these contributions and also presents a high level summary of telecommunication network
survivability schemes (itself an extremely broad area). The application of the latter within the
context of smart grid survivability is the main focus of this research study.

2.1

Integrated Smart Grid Failure Modelling

Various studies have looked at survivability modelling and design of coupled power
communication infrastructures. For example, [ROS08] gauges the impact of perturbations in the
electrical grid on higher layer routing performance in data communication networks. Coupling
factors are first introduced to model the degree of dependency between routing nodes and their
feeding power node, i.e., higher coupling values imply that slight power losses in related power
nodes can cause routing node outages. These factors are generally assigned based upon
geographic proximity. Next, a load “re-dispatching” strategy is also presented to model utility
load re-distribution to minimize departure from working state conditions after transmission line
(link) failures. A detailed study is then conducted using the Italian national electrical grid and
Internet backbone topologies. First, a detailed topological node-degree analysis is done for the
8

Italian electrical transmission grid, and the results indicate that it generally follows similar trends
in the North American grid. Next, the effects of grid perturbations (faults) are tested on overlying
routing performance. The findings here indicate a significant increase in packet routing delays,
even with moderate coupling levels (orders of magnitude higher), termed in [ROS08] as an interlayer amplification effect.

Meanwhile, [BLD10] looks at iterative cascading failures in interdependent powercommunication networks. Namely, power outages are assumed to lead to node outages, which in
turn lead to further power node outages. Now the model assumes an equivalent number of nodes
in both layers, as well as bi-directional failure dependencies between respective-numbered
nodes. Hence if a given layer node fails, then all its interconnected neighbors in the same layer
and interdependent layer are removed. Based upon this, analysis is conducted to identify the
critical number of failed nodes that can lead to complete fragmentation of the network (using
percolation theory). Specifically, the work assumes Erdos-Renyi network/grid topologies and
fails a random fraction of nodes in one of the layers to kick-start the iterative cascading process.
These iterations are continued until the number of mutually-connected components in the largest
sub-graph (cluster) stops changing. Using this method, the authors evaluate the performance of
various abstract networks with varying node degrees and distributions, see [BLD10]. Albeit a
good initial contribution, this work does not analyze realistic power grid/communication
topologies. Moreover, the bi-directional failure dependency assumption is not very realistic as
many networking sites will deploy backup power to prevent or delay node outages.
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[NEU13] also studies the impact of power outages on communication networks. First of
all, two-stage failure model is defined for power grid faults, i.e., where the first stage
removes/fails power lines intersecting a given circular (fault) region and the second stage
removes additional lines due to failure cascades. Here cascading line failures are computed by
solving a iterative direct current (DC) power flow problem over the remaining (working) lines,
i.e., versus a more complex/realistic alternating current (AC) model. Detailed simulations results
show that failures correlated about a circular region actually give higher post-fault satisfied
demand levels (yield) versus more dispersed independent failures, i.e., closer failure proximities
can actually lower cascading effects. Next, the authors incorporate data network dependency
concerns, i.e., by making network nodes fully-dependent upon their closest geographicallylocated power substation node. Findings show that cascading failures have a significant impact
on data network connectivity levels as well, i.e., measured via average node connectivity and
average connectivity probabilities between nodes (i.e., measure of post-fault disconnectivity).
Hence the authors propose future efforts to augment data network topologies and algorithms to
overcome cascading faults. However this work does not look at the further impact of
communication node outages on power grid control capabilities, which can readily worsen
cascades.

More recently [PAR13] has also studied robustness in interdependent power grid and
communication network infrastructures. Here the authors focus on computing the minimum
number of node outages that will result in total failure, i.e., minimum total failure removals
(MTFR), and consider both uni-directional and bi-directional dependency between nodes in the
respective layers. Furthermore, to achieve tractability, both infrastructures are also reduced to
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simplified star topologies, i.e., one generator site connecting multiple sub-stations and one
network control center router connecting to multiple sub-station routes. Now for the case of unidirectional dependency, the authors introduce the concept of cycles to show dependencies
between nodes. The MTFR problem is then is likened to the NP-complete graph hitting cycle
problem to determine the minimum number of removals, and several polynomial-time heuristics
are proposed, i.e., cycle-based and degree-based. Meanwhile, the bi-directional dependency case
is shown to be simpler (akin to vertex cover problem) and solvable in polynomial time, see
[PAR13]. These solutions are then tested for sample networks and as expected, the bi-directional
interdependency models are shown to be more robust. In addition, for the case of uni-directional
dependency the degree-based heuristic gives better performance, i.e., higher MTFR values, see
[PAR13] for details.

Meanwhile in [CAS13] the authors map heterogeneous networks to interdependent multilayer networks (IMLN) and analyze their survivability. The proposed IMLN model consists of
nodes, super-nodes, layers, intra-layer links, networked layers and inter-layer links. In particular,
the nodes within each layer form a network, and interconnecting nodes form different layers
represent different types of interdependencies. Furthermore, two failure propagation models are
considered, i.e., kill effect and precursor effect. Now in order to evaluate these models, the
authors estimate a function by generating the times to failure, propagating kill, and precursor
failures. Finally, all of these effects are combined to calculate the probability that a node
remains operational or becomes unavailable. In addition to evaluating the survivability of
interdependent networks, the authors also examine the impact of the reliability of wireless links
between the network nodes.
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Finally, the work in [RAH12] presents one of the first studies on the effects of
communication disconnectivity in smart transmission grids.

Namely, an optimization

formulation is used to compute load-shedding behaviors (distributions) after faults, with the goal
of minimizing total cost (with load-shedding penalties) as introduced in [CAR02].
Communication vulnerabilities are directly coupled into this model by defining/assigning load
controllability ratios for all loads, i.e., 0 meaning that the load is not controllable (disconnected).
The formulation is solved using the MATLAB MATPOWER package for the well-studied IEEE
118 transmission grid and overall findings show that communication network vulnerabilities can
greatly increase the probability of large-scale cascading failures.

In addition, [RAH13] also extends the above to model successive (cascading) failures
between the power grid and communication network infrastructures. This work assumes that
each substation node has an attached routing node and intelligent control agents
sending/receiving measurement signals/commands to/from the control center.

Several

communication network layer topologies are also evaluated here, including a base topology
matching the transmission grid as well as randomly-modified variations with increased and/or
decreased link counts, i.e., node degrees.

Furthermore, communication nodes are assigned

failure probabilities to model their coupling/interdependency to nearby power facilities, i.e.,
higher probabilities imply increased vulnerability to power outages in the geographical
proximity.

These interdependencies are then inserted into the DC power-flow model of

[CAR02],[RAH12] and solved iteratively until failures stop occurring. As expected, findings
show that failures propagate faster when there is increased coupling between the two layers,
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resulting in larger blackout sizes. However, increased node degrees (in the base topology) can
notably lower the size of cascading line outages.

Although the above studies provide some good insights (and base references), in general,
fixed probabilities do not accurately capture the post-attack recovery performance of complex
network survivability schemes under multi-failure conditions. Moreover, to date few/no studies
have actually looked at applying realistic communication network recovery schemes to improve
post-attack power grid element connectivity (controllability).

Some of these strategies are

briefly surveyed next.

2.2

Network Protection Schemes

Telecommunication network survivability/recovery from faults is a very well-studied area
and many different types of schemes have been developed over the years. However, given the
depth and breadth of this area, a detailed survey is very much out of scope. As a result, only a
subset of solutions are reviewed here, with a specific focus on those with more applicability to
fiber-optic networks (see also high-level summary Figure 2.1). Interested readers are also
referred to [CHL07] for more details.

2.2.1 Link Protection Schemes

Link protection is widely-deployed in fiber optic networks, and has its origins in earlier
synchronous optical network (SONET) technologies [WU92]. The basic approach here is to
13

provision a dedicated backup physical link for each working network link. This backup link is
usually routed along a geographically-diverse route in order to improve survivability, and may
require switchover actions upon detection of failure on the main working/primary links.

Figure 2.1: Overview of network recovery methods: pre- and post-fault

In particular, several key link protection schemes are in use today. The most basic scheme
here is 1+1 protection, which transmits two copies of the data between the end point nodes, i.e.,
along primary and backup fiber routes. The receiving node simply selects from the fiber with the
stronger signal, and hence failed link switchovers are almost seamless (within a few
milliseconds). However, 1+1 protection is very wasteful of fiber resources, as data is essentially
sent twice. To improve upon this, the 1:1 protection scheme oversubscribes the backup fiber by
using it to send lower priority data during working conditions, i.e., shared link protection.
Whenever a failure occurs on the primary route, this scheme pre-empts the lower priority traffic
and performs a switchover to re-route working traffic onto the backup link. However, this
scheme entails slightly more delays (10’s of milliseconds) and added end-to-end signaling
complexity to properly coordinate timely switchover events. Finally, some network operators
14

also use M:N link protection, which is a further generalization of 1:1 protection, i.e., where M
working fibers share N working links. However, regardless of their design, all link-based
protection schemes are very vulnerable to disaster-type events that can damage extensive parts of
a network.

2.2.2 Path Protection Schemes

As noted above, link protection schemes are localized in nature will recover all traffic on a
failed link, i.e., non-selective.

In many cases network operators will want to differentiate

between their clients and provide a higher grade of recovery to selected users. Along these lines,
a range of end-to-end connection path protection schemes have been developed, see [ZHU00].
These designs pre-compute backup routes for working connections, and perform switchover
actions upon detection of failures on primary routes. To overcome single link (node) failures,
these backup routes are usually link (or node) disjoint from the primary routes.

Now akin to the case of link protection, path protection can be done in either a dedicated or
shared manner [CHL07]. Namely, dedicated schemes pre-compute and reserve separate (nonshared) backup routes for all connections. Expectedly, these schemes yield lower resource
efficiency. As a result researchers have also proposed many shared protection strategies to allow
backup link resource sharing (of bandwidth, wavelengths) between multiple working paths as
long as they are link disjoint. The latter condition ensures that two working paths cannot fail at
the same time from a single link failure, preventing contention for backup bandwidth. However,
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shared protection schemes are more complicated and all connection level strategies require
additional end-to-end protocol signaling to perform working/backup switchovers.

In general, most protection schemes work well for single link failures, which are the most
common types in most networks. However, under more rare disaster conditions, these schemes
are very vulnerable since multiple failures can easily affect both working and backup connection
routes. Along these lines, more recent efforts have proposed specialized probabilistic protection
schemes [LEE10],[DIA12]. Unlike single failure recovery methods, these solutions do not try to
guarantee any form of recovery, i.e., as that is generally not possible under probabilistic multifailure scenarios. Instead, these strategies define a set of pre-existing (a-priori) probabilistic risk
regions in the network and then compute path pair routes to minimize joint failure probabilities
for the primary/working and backup routes. In particular, the work in [LEE10] proposes an
iterative version of Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm to compute disjoint path pairs, i.e., with
link weights defined as functions of a-priori risk failure probabilities. Meanwhile, [DIA12]
outlines a broader strategy that computes (multiple) k-shortest path pairs and selects the one
which minimizes failure probabilities and reduces resource usages/costs. Findings here show
improved performance over basic link-disjoint protection as well as the related scheme in
[LEE10].

2.2.3 Restoration Schemes

Network protection schemes basically pre-reserve recovery resources to provide some
level of guaranteed and rapid recovery. However, these schemes can be very resource inefficient
16

when backup resources are sitting idle/unused. As a result, many different shared protection
schemes have also been proposed to oversubscribe (multiplex) backup resources between
multiple working (non-failed) connection routes, see [CHL07]. However, these methods impose
much more provisioning complexity and are only designed to handle single link failures.

As an alternative, flexible post-fault restoration schemes have also been proposed here to
recover failed connections. Namely in these designs regular connections are simply provisioned
in an unprotected manner at the time of their start. However, in case of a fault event, dynamic
restoration algorithms are invoked to re-compute/re-establish failed working routes. In general,
two further strategies are proposed here, i.e., sub-path segment recovery and complete end-toend recovery [XU11]. Expectedly, these schemes give much better resource efficiencies as no
resources (link routes) are reserved for backup connections. However, at the same time, these
schemes cannot guarantee recovery (even for single node/link faults) as sufficient spare capacity
may not be available.

Finally, restoration strategies are also more latent since post-fault

signaling can take 100 ms-seconds to re-establish a new route.

2.3

Open Challenges

Although the work surveyed in Section 2.1 presents some good analyses of coupled powercommunication networks, these efforts do not take into account the further effects of network
survivability schemes to overcome control disconnection between remote transmission grid
agents (at PMU or PDC units) and SCC/NOC sites. This is a key concern as network designers
have developed a range of advanced recovery schemes for single and even multiple failure
17

conditions. As a result, a detailed study is now proposed to incorporate/model the impact of
network recovery techniques in smart transmission grids. Overall, given the fact that cascading
failures can evolve within tens of seconds or minutes, rapid sub-second network recovery can
play a vital role in minimizing power grid control disruption during such critical times.

18

CHAPTER 3: COUPLED TRANSMISSION GRID ANALYSIS

There is a critical need to incorporate network (control) connectivity when studying
cascading failure effects in power grids. However this is a rather challenging task as the
analytical methods used in the two fields are very different. For example, most networking
studies focus on discrete events, e.g., such as connection requests, packet arrivals, link/node
failures, etc.

Meanwhile most transmission grid analyses treat continuous time-varying

quantities, e.g., voltages, currents, phases. Hence it is very difficult to find or develop a single
evaluation scheme that can provide an accurate analysis of interdependent power-communication
grids under extreme failures.

•
•

Network topology
Faults/stressors

Communication
Network Protection
Schemes

•

•

•
•

Grid topology
Faults/stressors

Disconnected grid
components
Uncontrollable loads

DC Steady-State
Power Grid Analysis

•
•

Overloaded lines
Blackout sizes

Figure 3.1: Overview of two-stage power-communication smart grid fault analysis

19

To address the above concerns, this thesis proposes a tractable two-step modelling
approach by using a combination of network simulation and power-grid analysis, as shown in
Figure 3.1. Namely, the first step uses discrete event simulation (DES) to determine connection
failures in the communication network after a multi-failure event. Namely, this step identifies
the networking nodes/links that are physically damaged by the event, and then computes the
resultant grid components that lose connectivity to the NOC as a result of this damage. These
disconnected components are then treated as non-controllable loads and provided as inputs
(interdependencies) for the second step, which performs steady-state DC optimization analysis to
compute the number of overloaded lines.
Control
center
Control
disconnection

Routers,
switches

X

X
Communication Network
• Varying transmission links, i.e.,
optical fiber, PLC, microwave

Control
connections

• IP routing/switching nodes
• Survivability options:
- Pre-fault protection
- Post-fault restoration
- Region-disjoint routing

Network
outages

Generation

Power Transmission Grid
• Distributed diverse sources /
generation sites
Switching

• High-voltage transmission lines
w. fault relay monitoring

• Terminating sub-stations to
distribution grids
Grid system
failures

Figure 3.2: Failures in interdependent power-communication grids
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Several important assumptions are noted for this solution framework. First, the fiber-based
network is assumed to have the same topology as the transmission grid, i.e., switching/routing
nodes placed at all transmission loads and fiber-optic cables routed along all transmission line
routes. This symmetry is in-line with many of the studies noted in survey in Chapter 2. Next, it
is assumed that all networking node and link failures are caused by physical damage from
stressor events. Namely, further network outages (connection failures) resulting from power
outages due to overloaded transmission lines (i.e., after initial damage) are not considered here,
see Figure 3.2. This assumption simplifies the analysis and also facilitates an initial baseline
solution against which to gauge future strategies. Moreover, this assumption is further justified
by the fact that many utility operators are starting to install backup power supply units to
maintain post-disaster communications.

Hence the likelihood of additional network-layer

outages being induced by non-physical damage will likely decline in the future, i.e., as most
backup batteries will provide 2-3 days of operating power. Details on the two analysis steps in
Figure 3.1 are now presented.

3.1

Network Survivability Schemes

As high-lighted in Chapter 2, many types of network survivability schemes have been
developed. For the purposes herein, however, it is best to select those strategies that can provide
some level of recovery guarantee and timescales. Overall, such saliencies will minimize the
disruption of critical status/control information after a disaster event. As a result, proactive
network protection schemes are chosen here to pre-compute/pre-reserve dedicated (link-disjoint)
backup connection routes between all the remote transmission sites and the SCC/NOC. Namely,
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upon

detection

of

any connection

failures

after

a

physical

stressor

event,

fast

signaling/switchover actions are performed to switch communication to the backup routes,
typically within sub-second timescales.

Now carefully note that some trace analyses of large-scale transmission grid blackouts
have shown that cascading line failures tend to occur in the seconds-minutes range
[ROS08],[TFR04]. Hence the use of rapid protection schemes will generally help minimize the
occurrence of any race conditions between network (control connectivity) recovery and
underlying power grid dynamics. However, transient post-fault analysis of power grids may
reveal much faster dynamics (left for future study). Regardless, this would further justify the
choice of faster protection strategies, i.e., as opposed to restoration methods. The various
protection schemes are now presented.

3.1.1 No Protection (Baseline)

This approach routes working connections between the SCC/NOC site and all key
transmission grid locations (housing buses, generators, etc). This is done in order to provide a
“non-protected” baseline approach against which to compare the gains with more advanced
protection schemes. Namely, the ubiquitous Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm is used to
compute the connection routes over the networking layer graph. Now shortest-path computation
schemes typically require non-negative weights/costs for all links.

Along these lines, two

different link weighting strategies are chosen, minimum hop count and load-balancing. Consider
the details.
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In general, the bandwidth overheads for sending (receiving) grid statuses/commands are
expected to be relatively low, i.e., in the sub-gigabit range. As a result there is very little
likelihood of such overheads overloading a high-capacity control network. This further implies
that all links can be treated the same here, and therefore a basic graph-based algorithm is used to
find the shortest, i.e., minimum hop count, path between each transmission grid node and the
main NOC site. In particular, let the graph G(V,E) represent the communication network
topology, where V = { vi } is the set of nodes (switches) and E = { eij } is the set of links (C units
of bandwidth capacity each). The minimum hop count path can be determined by running
Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm with the link weights set to 𝜔𝑖𝑗 =1, i.e., for link eij between
nodes i and j.

However, in many instances, utility providers may also re-use their fiber-optic networks to
carry additional commercial bandwidth services, particularly in smaller regional markets. As
these services will result in higher carried loads, more advanced “load-based” connection routing
schemes can also be considered. In particular, these schemes compute dynamic link weights that
are inversely-proportional to the bandwidth usage on the links. The aim here is to avoid links
with higher weights (increased congestion levels). Again, this can be done by using Dijkstra’s
shortest-path algorithm with modified “load-aware” link weights computed as follows:

ij 

1
cij  

Eq. 3.1

where cij≤C is the residual (free) capacity on the link between nodes i and j, and ε is a small
value chosen to avoid floating-point division errors. However, this approach also has a tendency
to choose longer connection routes.
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3.1.2 Basic Link-Disjoint Protection

This strategy uses a greedy approach to compute all working/backup connection pairs.
Namely, a working connection route is first computed between two network nodes (e.g., NOC
and grid location) using the standard Dijkstra’s shortest-path graph algorithm. Subsequently, all
the links along this route are pruned and then Dijkstra’s algorithm is re-run to compute the linkdisjoint backup path. As per Section 3.1.1 above, link weight selection can be done using either
hop count minimization or load-balancing strategies.

3.1.3 Risk-Aware Link-Disjoint Protection

The link-disjoint protection scheme in Section 3.1.2 does not account for any separation
between the working/backup paths.

Now in general, if resource efficiency is not a major

concern, it is best to choose longer path pairs with increased geographic (risk) separation. Along
these lines, several “risk-based” path computation schemes have been developed in [LEE10] and
[DIA12], as reviewed in Section 2.2.2. These solutions introduce and leverage the probabilistic
shared risk link group (p-SRLG) concept to identify specific risk/vulnerability regions within a
network. Namely, a p-SRLG is defined as a subset of nodes/links within a certain geographic
region associated with a specific vulnerability/disaster threat. Here each such event is assigned a
unique occurrence probability, along with further conditional failure probabilities for all of its
associated nodes/links. For example, nodes/links closer to the epicenter of a disaster can be
assigned higher conditional failure probabilities than those further towards the edge, etc. Based
upon this model, various different path pair routing schemes are proposed to minimize joint
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working/backup route failures. In particular, the scheme from [DIA12] is adopted here and is
now detailed briefly.

Consider the requisite notation for probabilistic protection first. Foremost, a set of N
mutually-exclusive stressor regions is defined for a communication network topology graph
G(V,E). This set is denoted as F={f1 , f2 , … , fn}, where each fi represents a p-SRLG stressor.
Furthermore, each p-SRLG is assigned a fixed occurrence probability ϕi and is comprised of a set
of vulnerable links (or nodes) denoted by the set Xi, usually co-located within a given
geographical region. In addition, all links within Xi are also assigned independent conditional
failure probabilities, i.e., pijk for the link between nodes j and k. Using these p-SRLG definitions,
the probabilistic protection scheme first computes the k-shortest paths between the NOC and
each grid location/site. Again, these routes can be selected based upon minimum hop count or
load-balancing objectives (as per Section 3.1.1). Next, each of these shortest paths is pruned and
its corresponding link-disjoint backup path computed, i.e., thereby generating a set of k linkdisjoint path pairs. Finally, the path pair with the minimum joint failure probability is chosen as
the final working/backup connection pair to the particular grid site. Specifically, the joint
conditional failure probability given stressor fi is represented by:
𝑖
𝑖
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒|𝑓𝑖 ) = ∏𝑒𝑗𝑘∈𝑤(1 − 𝑝𝑗𝑘
) ∏𝑒𝑚𝑛∈𝑏(1 − 𝑝𝑚𝑛
)

Eq. 3.2

where w is the working path and b is the backup path. Namely, the end-to-end connection path
failure probabilities can be written as two series product terms, i.e., due to the assumption of
independent conditional link failure probabilities, see [DIA12] for more details.
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3.2

Transmission Grid Fault Analysis

Transmission grid analysis takes the outputs from the previous network simulation stage,
i.e., set of uncontrollable loads, and computes the final post-fault power flow and load shedding
distributions, Figure 3.1. Now various algorithms have been developed to compute power flow
distribution under normal working (non-failure) conditions, see [WOD96]. Further contributions
have also proposed optimization schemes for failure load-shedding analysis [CAR02], and these
have been applied in recent studies on interdependent grids [RAH12],[RAH13] (see Chapter 2).
As a result, the work herein simply re-applies these techniques to obtain a realistic modelling of
steady-state post-fault load shedding behaviors.

Consider a transmission system of a power grid with V nodes (sub-stations) interconnected
by m transmission lines. The sets L and G are the set of load buses and the set of generator buses,
respectively. In addition, Lj represents the demand at the load bus j. Now the well-known DC
power-flow equation can be summarized as:

~
~
F  AP

Eq. 3.3

~

where P is a power vector whose components are the input powers of the nodes in the grid

~

(except for the reference generator), F is a vector whose m components are the power flow
through the transmission lines, and A is a matrix whose elements can be calculated in terms of
the connectivity of transmission lines and their impedances. Since this system does not
necessarily have a unique solution, an optimization approach is proposed in [CAR02] to
minimize a cost function given by the following:
Cost 

w
iG

g
i
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gi 

w
jL

l
j

lj

Eq. 3.4

where wgi and wlj are positive values representing the generation cost for every node in G and the
load-shedding price for every node in L, respectively. Now the solution to this optimization

~

problem is given by the pair gi and lj (components of P ) that minimizes Eq. 3.4. Also note that
lj = θjLj+bj, where bj is determined by the optimization and θ is the load-shedding constraint, i.e.,
defined as the ratio of uncontrollable loads (i.e., loads that do not participate in load shedding) to
the total power grid load. Namely, a value of θ=1 means load shedding cannot be implemented,
whereas θ=0 means there is no constraint in implementing the load shedding. Furthermore, this
formulation also assumes a high price for load shedding, i.e., loads are curtailed only due to
generation inadequacy or transmission capacity limitations. Finally, various constraints are also
added to bound/generate a valid solution, i.e.,

~

~

1) DC power ﬂow equations: F  AP

2) Limit generator powers to under Gmax: 0 < gi < Gmax, i ϵ G
3) Limit controllable loads: (1 – θj)Lj ≤ bj ≤ 0, j ϵ L, lj = θjLj+bj
4) Limit power flow through lines: Fk < Ckopt (k=1, … , m)
5) Power balancing constraints (for power generated and consumed): Σ gi + Σ lj = 0

Note that in the above formulation, the lj values are negative and the gi values are positive
by definition. In addition the power grid loading level—denoted by the ratio of total demand to
total generation capacity—also affects the initial load (Lj values). Overall, the solution to this
optimization problem determines the amount of load shedding, generation, and the power flow
through the lines. Now when a failure occurs, the NOC will use the above optimization to
redistribute power within the grid. If this new power flow distribution overloads certain lines,
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more failures will occur, resulting in another round of re-optimization. Hence this process is
iterated until no more failures occur in the system. Note that the overloading threshold of a line
depends on many factors such as the capacity estimation error, which in turn can depend on the
communication system efficiency.
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CHAPTER 4: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Smart transmission grid performance under failure conditions is now tested using
numerical software analysis techniques. First, the chosen network protection schemes (Section
3.1) are analyzed using DES analysis [PCH92]. These techniques are widely-used to evaluate
complex networking behaviors as a series of responses to events, e.g., such a connection requests
arrivals, control messages, link failures, etc. Although many network simulation tools are
available, the state-of-the-art OPNET ModelerTM toolkit is used as it provides a complete
development environment (with a full C/C++ backend) and an easy-to-use graphical user
interface (GUI). Meanwhile, all power transmission grid analysis is done using the MATLAB®
MATPOWER package. Specifically, the set of failed network connections after a failure (i.e.,
disconnected transmission grid loads) are inputted to the power analysis tool to determine the
final DC steady-state load distributions, i.e., as per the load optimization model in Section 3.2
and [CAR02]. Full details are now presented.

4.1

Power Transmission Grid Topology

Performance analysis is conducted using the ubiquitous IEEE 118 bus transmission grid
topology [IEEE118]. This topology represents a realistic regional power infrastructure in the
Midwestern United States and has been widely used in many studies, as show in Figure 4.1. In
particular, this configuration consists of 19 generators, 177 lines, 9 transformers, 91 loads, and
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35 synchronous condensers. The latter elements either generate or absorb reactive power as
needed to adjust voltages in the grid (and thereby improve the power factor) and are also treated
as generators. As a result, the overall MATLAB® MATPOWER input case for this topology has 54
generators (i.e., 19 generators and 35 synchronous condensers), 186 lines (i.e., 177 lines and 9
transformers), and 118 buses. A revised illustration of the IEEE 118 grid showing these different
components is also shown in Figure 4.2. Now as per the assumptions in Chapter 3, the fiberoptic communication network topology is also set to mirror that of the transmission grid, i.e.,
with routers/switches placed at all generator/bus locations and fibers routed along transmission
line paths using rights-of-way.

Further analysis shows that this network has a maximum

(minimum) node degree of 12 (1) and an average node degree of 3.15 links/per node.

Figure 4.1: IEEE 118 transmission grid topology
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Figure 4.2: IEEE 118 transmission grid topology (alternate graphical view)

Now the overall goal of the failure mitigation strategy in Chapter 3 is to try to maintain as
much control connectivity (with the centralized NOC site) after stressor events. As a result, the
placement/location of NOC sites will have a direct impact on blackout sizes, along with the types
of occurring multi-failure events. For example, if the NOC site is located in a high-risk region
and a stressor occurs in that vicinity, then extensive blackouts will likely occur. This is treated
as a rare degenerate case, and hence is not analyzed. Instead, it is reasonable to assume that the
NOC locations will be placed in relatively safe regions, with minimal geographic or
meteorological risk exposures. Along these lines, node 37 is chosen as the NOC location site
and several probabilistic risk/vulnerability regions are defined with varying degrees of severity.
Expectedly, the NOC is excluded from any of these risk regions.
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4.2

Analysis Results and Findings

Sample results for the IEEE 118 transmission topology are now presented. The tests define
three risk regions centered about sub-station nodes 15, 69, and 96, respectively, see Figure 4.3.
Furthermore the probabilistic protection scheme [DIA10] is tested using two different a-priori
failure region definitions, i.e., one in which all regions have a single node, Figure 4.3a, and
another in which the regions have multiple nodes, Figure 4.3b.

Note that this a-priori

information is only used by the probabilistic protection scheme (Section 3.1.3) to compute
protection routes.

Figure 4.3: Testcase scenario with 3 failure regions
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Num. Overloaded Lines

Figure 4.4: Average number of failed lines (fault center around node 69)

The first set of tests trigger failure(s) centered near sub-station node 69 with varying
severity levels, i.e., 1-3 node failures. The two-stage analysis (Chapter 3) is then applied and the
total blackout size measured by the resultant number of failed (overloaded) transmission lines.
These findings are shown in Figure 4.4, where the labels “HC” and “LB” correspond to
minimum hop count and load-balancing path computation (Section 3.1), respectively, and “Prob
*” corresponds to probabilistic protection for single-node failure regions (Figure 4.3a) and “Prob
**” corresponds to probabilistic protection for multi-node failure regions (Figure 4.3b). Overall,
these results show a sizeable increase in the number of failed lines (load shedding) for 2 or 3 substation node failures, e.g., almost double those with single-node failures. In addition, these
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findings also show that network protection gives some improvement. For example, basic linkdisjoint protection (using both hop-count and load-balancing path computation) gives about 1020% fewer failed lines. More importantly, the advanced probabilistic protection scheme gives
the lowest load shedding results. In particular, the larger a-priori risk region definitions in Figure
4.3b (labelled as “Prob**”) tend to give slightly fewer failed lines for double and triple node
failures.

Num. Overloaded Lines

Figure 4.5: Average number of failed lines (fault center around node 15)

The above tests are now repeated for the failure region centered around node 15 with
varying degrees of severity, as shown in Figure 4.5 In this case, the results show a much more
34

sizeable reduction in the number of failed/overloaded lines when using connection-level
protection, i.e., more than 50% for single node failure. This gain is likely due to the reduced
topological connectivity in this region, i.e., single node failure can affect many transiting
network connection routes. However, for this very same region, the more advanced probabilistic
protection scheme gives no improvements here.

Num. Disconnected Nodes

Figure 4.6: Number of failed connections (fault center around node 69)

Carefully note that the number of overloaded lines is related to the number of failed
underlying communication control connections. Hence in order to get better insights of these
network-level behaviors, Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 plot the number of failed connection routes
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for the various protection schemes for failures centered about sub-station node 69 and sub-station
node 15, respectively.

Overall these findings reveal somewhat similar trends between the

number of failed networking connections and number of overloaded transmission lines.
However, expectedly there is no linear relationship here due to the highly complex nature of the
interdependency between the communication and power transmission grid layers.

Num. Disconnected Nodes

Figure 4.7: Number of failed connections (fault center around node 15)
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

This thesis addresses the topic of failures in integrated smart transmission grids. The main
objective here is to study the performance of various network recovery schemes in such settings
and gauge their impacts on mitigating the number of overloaded lines (i.e., load
shedding/blackout sizes). In general, this is a very difficult problem to study, and hence a
combination of discrete-event network simulation and stochastic power-grid modelling
techniques are used to provide an approximate steady-state analysis.

The overall conclusions

from this effort are now presented along with some directions for future work.

5.1

Conclusions

The overall findings of this study indicate that network-level protection schemes can
reduce the impact of system failures in integrated smart grids. Specifically, these solutions can
improve post-fault control connectivity and thereby achieve a reduction in blackout sizes, as
measured via the number of failed transmission loads. In addition, more advanced probabilistic
protection schemes can also be more effective here. However, these strategies require accurate
pre-specification (a-priori knowledge) of randomized potential failure regions in order to provide
meaningful improvements.
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5.2

Future Directions

This research presents a good basis from which to extend into further studies on smart grid
survivability design. Foremost, few studies have looked at modelling the detailed transient
nature of cascading failures in power grids, i.e., at second or sub-second timescales. Hence it is
important to study if rapid network recovery schemes (operating in the milliseconds-to-subseconds range) can affect such transient behaviors. In addition, broader studies can also look at
designing more resilient networking topologies for smart transmission grids.

In general,

increased node degrees will provide better post-fault connectivity (and hence load
controllability).

However, in real-world settings one cannot arbitrarily change or expand

network-layer topologies to increase node-level connectivity.

Instead, such build-outs are

usually deemed as longer-term undertakings and generally planned (optimized) according to a
range of factors, i.e., such as cost, policy constraints, geographic settings, etc. Along these lines,
future efforts can also look at constrained (and optimized) design of network control topologies
design to minimize cascading behaviors. The use of mixed networking technology types, e.g.,
wireless and fiber-optic, can also be considered here.
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